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JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OR MERE COINCIDENCE?
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"The kind of inquiry that would contribute most to understanding and
evaluating a judicial] nomination is... discussion first, of the nominee's broad
judicial philosophy and, second, of her views on particular constitutional
issues. "/
Elena Kagan, Supreme Court Justice
I. INTRODUCTION
She is much too liberal, too conservative, a judicial activist, a strict
constructionist: all are characterizations used to explain and discover a judge's
judicial philosophy, an endeavor discussed above by now-Supreme Court
Justice Elena Kagan. A judge's opinions often serve as fodder for court
observers and commentators as they attempt to cull a general picture of the
judge's constitutional values from the text. Underpinning this process are
various philosophical theories adopted by judges that contribute to their
judicial beliefs.
This paper suggests that judicial opinions often reflect ajudge's position on
what is ethical and useful in the real world of constitutional values. It further
suggests that an appreciation of legal philosophical theory assists one in
understanding the ethical and public policy dimensions of a court's opinion.
Do judges' opinions parallel philosophical theories constructed by
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1. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and Neiw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 935 (1995) (reviewing
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1995)).
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philosophers or is any apparent relationship mere coincidence? This paper
suggests the former-that a judge's belief system, education, and experiences 2
include the adoption of judicial philosophies, the expression of which can be
found in his or her written opinions.
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis observed that "[p]olitical, social,
and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society." 3 Justice
Brandeis was right to recognize the "eternal youth" of the common law as it
evolves to satisfy societal needs. Judicial philosophy often embraces an
ethical and social dimension in its analysis, representative of the law's "eternal
youth." To better understand a judge's judicial philosophy it is useful to
appreciate how appellate judges often construct legal arguments by following
a legal philosophical theory. The purpose of investigating a judge's judicial
philosophy is not necessarily to focus on one theory as it applies to the
resolution of a legal dispute, but rather to contextualize the influence of theory
as it exists on a continuum of both past and future development.
This paper introduces theories of justice created by prominent
philosophers and explains how they relate to jurisprudential analysis. It
further argues that the process of understanding legal analysis should
include an appreciation of the ethical theories that underlie the judicial
resolution of legal issues. Ronald Dworkin reminds us that "[l]awsuits matter
in another way that cannot be measured in money or even liberty. There is
inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law, and so a standing risk of a
distinct form of public injustice." 4 This proposition is useful to the study of
resolutions to a legal dispute. The "moral dimension" of a case relevant to this
judicial analysis is best explored by extrapolating any salient "ethical
dilemmas" from the facts of the case.
How does one identify ethical dilemmas? While there are a number of
useful methods, one of the more common is "stakeholder analysis."
Stakeholder analysis starts with an examination of the parties affected by the
decision in the case. For example, if the case involves corporate entities,
"stakeholders" would include the employees, suppliers, stockholders,
customers, lender banks, corporate boards and executives, and any other
2. James Barron, A Neuw York Bloc on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at Al (noting
that if Elena Kagan were confirmed the court would, for the first time in its history, contain four judges
born in New York City).
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (1986) (emphasis added).
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communities affected by the corporation's operation. If the stakeholders are
unjustly deprived of moral or legal rights there is an "ethical dilemma" to be
resolved by the courts.
A. Resolution of an Ethical Dilemma
Once critics of judicial philosophy discover these ethical dilemmas they
should attempt to resolve them. This is a significant challenge since often
stakeholders may have to endure giving up rights for the common good. This
tension is exemplified in cases that examine eminent domain, a government
taking of private property with 'just compensation."5 The private property
owner may be convinced the taking was unjust and the compensation
inadequate. So it is important to recognize the impossibility of a decision
equitable to all stakeholders.
A number of prominent ethicists have created various methods and ethical
theories that are useful in discussing and resolving judicial disputes. The
ancient Greeks, philosophers of the Enlightenment, and contemporary
philosophers have all written about ethical theories. The selected theories
discussed in this paper are selected from among many, with no attempt to
exhaust the field.6 The paper discusses how such theories apply to an
understanding of our jurisprudence and provides a better appreciation of a
judge's judicial philosophy. It is important to note that a judge may utilize
many judicial philosophies in deciding a case and, depending on the nature of
a dispute, adopt various philosophical theories in developing his or her legal
argument.
Legal scholars should be acquainted with the predominant philosophers
who have formulated the moral and ethical foundations of our contemporary
judicial thinking. Legal scholars and judges who continue to influence our
jurisprudence and public policy should understand the relationship of law to
moral and ethical reasoning.
B. Is PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY RELEVANT TO OUR JURISPRUDENCE?
Since appellate court cases decide litigants' rights and obligations, it is
informative to understand the courts' substantive findings, including the moral
and ethical underpinnings of a judge's reasoning. The legal academy
generally avoids this process, content with an explanation of substantive and
procedural analysis. If the academy argues and debates contemporary legal
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
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issues without an appreciation of the philosophy that supports the courts'
rationales, it will be difficult to fully recognize and understand the
jurisprudential theory that shapes the legal landscape.
Critics of contemporary court decisions should understand and relate to
ethical theory found in natural law, legal positivism, utilitarianism, legal
realism, and social relativism. This process has been referred to as "ethical
legalism ' 7 and should be useful in understanding the relationship between law
and ethics. What theories of justice are currently forming our contemporary
notions of due process, equal protection, and equal opportunity?
Jurisprudential analysis should engage in a resolution of that inquiry using
deontological and teleological ethical theories used in court decisions.
This paper selects for discussion classical and contemporary philosophers
and legal scholars who have contributed to current judicial thinking. There are
others whose theories have made significant contributions to jurisprudence
that are not mentioned in the text. The selection is based on those
philosophers and scholars most often discussed in contemporary legal
literature. Part II introduces prominent philosophers who have added to our
jurisprudence. A more exhaustive review of their philosophy is beyond the
scope of this paper and is available in copious encyclopedic works. Part III
applies the theories discussed to a recent reverse discrimination Supreme
Court case8 that illustrates how judges follow a particular judicial philosophy.
This paper argues that judges often referred to by jurisprudential labels are
following ethical theories inherent in their thought processes that contribute to
their jurisprudential analysis. Part IV argues that an understanding of legal
philosophical theory is necessary to identify a judge's judicial philosophy and
should be useful in clarifying the oversimplification and often misleading
characterization of a judge as being either liberal or conservative.
Furthermore, it asserts that an understanding of how a court adopts a legal
philosophy in deciding a case is useful in appreciating the moral and ethical
dimensions of a decision.
7. Gerald R. Ferrera, Ethics in Legal Education: An Augmentation of Legal Realism, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 39,
52 53 (1991).
8. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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II. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF LAW
A. NATURAL LAW - Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274)
Natural law first appears in Cicero's explanation of the Greek Stoic
philosophers who emphasized virtue, morals and ethics 9 as appropriate
guiding principles of behavior. Starting with Homer, Greek philosophers
developed their theory of natural law in an attempt to explain the human
conditions that are subject to nature's laws. 10  The Greek philosophers
deferred to the cosmic order of things and reconciled "fate" as following the
laws of nature and order in the universe.II
From the Romans, who adopted the Greek culture, up to the time of
Thomas Aquinas, there existed various theories of the Greek version of natural
law.' 2 However, Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae, developed natural law as
God's guiding Providence, establishing God as the center of all order.'3
Aquinas argued:
Among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in the
most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of providence, being
provident both for itself and for others. Thus it has a share of the Eternal
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. 14
In order to best appreciate Aquinas's theory of natural law one should start
with his understanding of human nature. In Question 75 in the Summa he
states: "We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin." 5
He refers to Dionysius, who stated that "three things are to be found in
spiritual substances - essence, power, and operation.... '1 6 Aquinas argues the
soul is "the form of a body."' His position is that "the nature of the species
belongs [to] what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition
9. See LLOYD L. WE1NREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 39-40 (1987) (presenting an analysis of legal
positivism and natural law).
10. See ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 228-29 (3d ed. 2007).
11. Roscoe Pound, Lau, and Morals, I J. Soc. FORCES 350, 351 (1923) ("All discussion of... the relation of
jurisprudence to ethics, goes back to the Greek thinkers .... ").
12. See generally Edward J. Damich, The Essence of Laut, According to Thomas Aquinas, 30 AM. J. JURIS.
79, 79 (1985) (arguing that for Aquinas an unjust law may have some legal attributes but does not have all the
definitional elements and is not really a law).
13. Patrick Halligan, The Environmental Policy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 19 ENVTL. L. 767 (1989) (arguing
that Aquinas would not have given nonhuman creatures juridical standing to sue).
14. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 997 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1915)
(1274).
15. Id. at pt. 1, q. 75.
16. Id.
17. Id. at pt. I, q. 75, art. 5.
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does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter."1 8 His treatise on
natural law is found in the Summa, Questions 90 to 108. Aquinas begins with
a definition of law as "a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to
act or is restrained from acting... the rule and measure of human acts is the
reason, which is the first principle of human acts.. .law is something pertaining
to reason."1 9 A principal contribution of Aquinas's theory on natural law is its
reference to reason and the common good.20 From Aquinas's theological
perspective he views man as a composition of body and soul capable of
sensorial perceptions and argues that natural law was discernible by all.2'
Reason, assisted by Revelation, became the human expression of God's
eternal law. Aquinas states that "[tihe natural law is promulgated by the very
fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him
naturally. '22
The Catholic Church continues to adopt Aquinas's natural law as its
philosophical doctrine.23 However, apart from its theological foundation in
Catholic doctrine, natural law after Aquinas began to decline.24  The
Enlightenment philosophers - Hobbes, 25 Locke, 26 Rousseau 27 and Kant28
all made references to natural law, although within different constructs, as
18. Id. at pt. I, q. 7 5, art. 4.
19. Id. atpt. 1-11, q. 90, art. 1.
20. Id. at pt. 1-11, q. 90, art. 3 ("A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the
common good.").
21. See SAMUEL WELLS & BEN QUASH, INTRODUCING CHRISTIAN ETHICS 91 (2010)
22. Id. at pt. 1-11, q. 90, art. 4.
23. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 71 (Vatican trans., St. Paul Books & Media 1993)
(explaining the foundations of Catholic moral theology and asserting "the immutability of the natural law
itself, and thus the existence of 'objective norms of morality'").
24. Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 539, 559 (1989) ("Application of the natural law is not limited to those who accept Catholic teaching.").
25. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (Penguin Books 1968) (1651) (expressing the sentiment that
natural law can be known through reason and that the individual has a natural right to preserve his or her
own life). For a further explanation of Hobbes' view of natural law, see NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS
HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION (Daniela Gobeth trans., 1993); see also John Gahbauer,
Natural Law Theory Through the Eyes of Hobbes, Grotius and Pqfendorf, 2 EUDAIMONIA: GEO. PHIL.
REV. 38, 39 (2005) (concluding that "there is little concordance as to what constitutes the natural law").
26. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 264 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts
Press 1952) (1690) (The law of nature "willeth [sic] the peace and preservation of all mankind."). For
an analysis of Locke's view of natural law, see Steven Forde, Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in
Locke, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 396 (2001) (exploring Locke's position that morality is grounded in natural
law).
27. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 9 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762) ("[R]enunciation [of liberty] is incompatible with man's nature.").
28. See, e.g., Jerome B. Schneewind, Kant and Natural Law Ethics, 104 ETHICS 53 (1993) (explaining the
relationship between Kant's moral philosophy and natural law interpretation of morality).
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promulgations of the natural order. Contemporary defenders of natural law,
within a jurisprudential context, view it as an assertion that "law is a part of
ethics. '29
Indeed, natural law principles are used to infuse ethical concepts into legal
analysis) 0 The Greeks and Romans used natural law as an objective standard
that measured civil laws. What are the objective ethical standards ofjustice?31
Consider the following objective legal standards of our common law such as
"due care" in a negligence suit, "good faith" in a contracts claim, "reasonable
care," "due process of law" and "equality" that all have their origin in natural
law theory. It is of interest to note that the Framers of the United States
Constitution did not define many of our cherished notions of equality, due
process and freedom of speech. A natural law proponent would argue they are
inherent in our reasoning process based on our natural desire forjustice.
Roscoe Pound, in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Law stated:
It was not that natural law expressed the nature of man [.] [Here he differs from
Aquinas.] [R]ather it expressed the nature of government. One form of this
variant was due to our doctrine that the common law of England was in force
only so far as applicable to our conditions and our institutions. The attempt to
put this doctrine philosophically regards an ideal form of the received common
law as natural law and takes natural law to be a body of deductions from or
implications of American institutions or the nature of our polity.
32
One could argue the common law has incorporated natural law principles such
as "good faith" in a contract, "due care" and "reasonable care" in a negligence
suit, and the notion that individuals are protected by the Bill of Rights.
John Finnis, 33 in his Natural Law and Natural Rights, argues that positive
laws ought to conform to objective normative principles of natural law.34
Finnis suggests that we are led to an understanding of the objective normative
29. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxtord Univ. Press 1980) (describing natural
rights as having their foundation in natural law).
30. David 0. Brink, Legal Positivism and Natural Law Reconsidered Again, 2 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 171
(1989) (suggesting that "we should distinguish, within legal philosophy, between theories of legal validity...
and theories of adjudication. ); Igor Grazin, Natural Lau, as a Forum of Legal Studies, 37 AM. J. JURIS. I
(1992); Patrick Halligan, The Environmental Policy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 19 ENVTL. L. 767 (1989).
31. R. George Wright, Legal Obligation and the Natural Lair, 23 GA. L. REv. 997, 1011 (1989) ("What
humans ought to do, what they are morally bound to do, flows from their distinctive nature."); Rice, supra
note 24, at 559.
32. ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 50 (Yale Univ. Press 1922).
33. See JOHN FrNNTS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). For a critique of Finnis, see Anthony
J. Lisska, Finnis and Veatch on Natural Law in Aristotle and Aquinas, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 55 (1991) (critiquing
Finnis's natural law ethics); Valerie Kerruish, Philosophical Retreat: A Criticism of John Finnis' Theory of
Natural Law, 15 U. W. AUSTRALIA L. REV. 224 (1983); Ian Duncanson, Finnis and the Politics of Natural
Law, 19 U. W. AUSTRALIA L. REv. 239 (1989).
34. See Lisska, supra note 33, at 60-61.
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principles not by rigorous differential analysis but rather by "careful reflection,
or meditation, directly to an awareness of self-evident, indemonstrable
truths.135 Finnis and Aquinas regard the principles of natural law as self-
evident. Lloyd L. Weinreb, in his Natural Law & Justice, agrees but finds that
Finnis's "extract[ion] of Aquinas's doctrine of natural law from its context and
treat[ment] [of] it as separable from the idea of a universal order according to
the Eternal Law of God not only radically distorts Aquinas's philosophy as a
whole but misconceives the doctrine of natural law itself."36 He explains that
deontologically there is an argument that "[flaw's very nature... impresses on
it a minimum moral content."'37 Whatever that "minimum moral content"
might be determines the natural law advocates' position that unjust laws need
not be obeyed. 38
It is important to note that one need not have a religious belief to be a
natural law proponent.3 9 Robert George, another contemporary proponent of
the natural law, posed the following question during a scholarly lecture:
"[C]an natural law... provide the basis for a regime of human rights law
without consensus on the existence and nature of God and the role of God in
human affairs?" 40 In response, George goes on to say: "In my view, anybody
who acknowledges the human capacities for reason and freedom has good
grounds for affirming human dignity and basic human rights."41
The critical doctrine of natural law is the principle that our positive law
must comply with objective standards of fundamental rights that assure
equality for all. Humankind has an absolute dignity that natural law
recognizes and protects. Indeed, in his Letter from Birmingham Jail,
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. invoked the natural law:
How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man
made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is
a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St.
Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law
and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that
degrades human personality is unjust. 42
35. WELNREB, supra note 9, at 109.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Casefor Natural Lau, Reexamined, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1993); Jerome
B. Schneewind, Kant and Natural Lam, Ethics, 104 ETHIcS 53 (1993); R. George Wright, Legal Obligation
and the Natural Lai, 23 GA. L. REV. 997 (1989).
40. Robert George, Natural Lair, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 182 (2008).
41. Id.
42. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL (Apr. 16, 1963), reprinted in 26 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 835, 840 (1993).
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We see natural law sentiments invoked in judicial decisions as well. The
ruling that privacy is a fundamental implied constitutional right found in the
Ninth Amendment is an example of a natural law theory.4 3 More recently, the
Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago upheld the right to bear arms as a
fundamental right "necessary to our system of ordered liberty. '44 Responding
to Justice Breyer's concern in his dissenting opinion that applying this right to
state and local gun control laws would necessarily limit the "legislative
freedom of the State,"45 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, reiterated the
Court's earlier pronouncement that 'the enshrinement of constitutional rights
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.' ' 46 It is of interest to
recognize the use of natural law principles by both a reputedly liberal Justice
(Breyer) and a reputedly conservative Justice (Alito). Concepts of "freedom"
and "the enshrinement of constitutional rights" are inherently reasonable
theories necessary for ajust society.47
B. LEGAL POSITIVISM - John Austin (1790-1854)
"The matter ofjurisprudence is positive law. "48
- John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence
John Austin, the founder of legal positivism, was the Chair of Jurisprudence
at the University College London.49 During his tenure as Chair, Austin
published his lectures under the title of The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined. Austin's theory of legal positivism is useful in critical legal
thinking as a reminder that law is not wholly dependant on a system of
morality, but rather on a combination of utilitarian rights, duties, and
obligations.50 However, Austin does not deny that law can be analyzed from a
moral perspective. In fact, Austin stressed just the opposite and insisted that
law has a moral perspective. 51
43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
44. 130 S. Ct 3020, 3042 (2010).
45. Id. at 3050.
46. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
47. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
48. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 88 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d ed. 1869).
49. See Stanley L. Paulson, The Theory of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 525, 525 (2005).
50. Luke Robinson, Moral Principles Are Not Moral Lawvs, 2 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 3 (2008); Margot
Stubbs, Feminism andLegal Positivism, 3 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & Soc'Y 63 (1986).
51. See DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 7 (1984); Carlos Santiago Nino, Positivism and
Communitarianism: Between Human Rights and Democracy, 7 RATIO JURIS 14 (1994); Deryck Beyleveld &
Roger Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985); H. Hamner Hill, H.L.A. Hart's Hermeneutic Positivism: On Some Methodological
Dificulties in the Concept ofLaiw, 3 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 113 (1990).
2011]
570 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:4
Austin divided the laws that guide human behavior into (1) divine law, (2)
positive law and (3) positive morality. 52 Divine law would include Revealed
Law established by God.53  Positive law is created by the sovereign of a
community, such as a legislative body.54  Positive morality would include
positive laws and contemporary attitudes. 55 Positive law is judged to be moral
or immoral depending on how it serves the welfare of others. 56 Austin admits
to an objective morality founded in a theological conception of Divine Law. 57
He believed that all laws are coercive commands that must serve the general
welfare. According to Roscoe Pound, Austin defines a right as "a 'faculty'
residing in a determinate person by virtue of a given rule of law which avails
against and answers to a duty lying on some other person. '58
H. L. A. Hart formulated in his The Concept of Law the most widely
accepted theory of Austin's positive law.59 Hart views law as social facts
formed by individuals who internalize a standard and thereby create a rule.60
Hart believes that moral obligations are determined by socially accepted
rules. 61  Hart makes a distinction between primary and secondary rules
wherein the former create rights and duties, while the latter establish how and
by whom primary rules may be enacted, amended or extinguished. 62 Both
Austin and Hart view law as a social phenomenon subject to empirical
analysis. 63 Writing for the majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, Justice Kennedy ruled that "[t]here is simply no support for the
52. 2 JoHN AUSTIN, supra note 48, at 175-76.
53. Id. at 294
54. Id. at 337
55. Hill, supra note 51, at 115 (arguing "that moderate externalism cannot bear the weight that Hart places
upon it"); David Dyzenhaus, Why Positivism is Authoritarian, 37 Am. J. JuRts. 83 (1992).
56. Hill, supra note 51, at X.
57. 2 JoN AUSTIN, supra note 48, at 175-76.
58. Roscoe Pound, Fiy Years of Jurisprudence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 557, 571 (1937); see also LYONS, supra
note 51, at7.
59. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); see also TE AUTONOMY OF THE LAW, ESSAYS ON LEGAL
POSITIVISM (Robert George ed., 1999) (exploring the current state of legal positivism in a series of essays
written by leading contemporary philosophers of the law); LYONS, supra note 51, at 51; Rosina L. Hunt,
Natural Lan, v. Positive Lan,: Interpreting Morality, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 231 (1993).
60. William C. Starr, Laiw and Morality in HL.A. Hart's Legal Philosophy, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 682
(1984) ("Hart holds that law is an instrument of social control."); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the
Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987).
61. See Starr, supra note 60, at 681.
62. Wellman, supra note 60, at 474 ("Dworkin's kinship with Hart... implies that the Legal Process
tradition is more vital than has commonly been supposed.").
63. See generally David Dyzenhaus, Why Positivism is Authoritarian, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 83 (1992) (arguing
that contemporary positivists collaborate in an authoritarian political project); Deryck Beyleveld & Roger
Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1985) ("Revelation, Austin holds, is an incomplete guide to the will of God, utility is no
index of it, and appeals to conscience are a cloak for superstition and ignorance."); Margot Stubbs, Feminism
and Legal Positivism, 3 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & Soc'Y 63 (1986); Pound, supra note 58.
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view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the
suppression of political speech by media corporations."64 Quoting from the
dissent in United States v. Automobile Workers, Justice Kennedy states:
Under our Constitution it is We The People who are sovereign. The people
have the final say. The legislators are their spokesmen. The people determine
through their votes the destiny of the nation. It is therefore important-vitally
important-that all channels of communications be open to them during every
election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have
access to the views of every group in the community. 65
Hart's version of positive law would argue that we have a moral obligation
based on the Constitution to include all political points of view in the election
process.
C. UTILITARIANISM - John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
"[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. "66
- John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
John Stuart Mill was one of the most influential philosophers in England
during the nineteenth century.67 Mill was an empiricist and would accept and
believe a proposition only if it could be experienced. 68 One could trace the
logic of the American legal realism movement to his theory of utilitarianism.
Ronald Dworkin, in his text Taking Rights Seriously, states that Mill "deploys
a pessimistic theory of human nature, emphasizes the value of cultural and
historical constraints on egotism, and insists on the role of the state in
educating its citizens away from individual appetites and toward social
conscience." 69 David Lyons, in his text Ethics and the Rule of Law, argues
that Mill attempted to reconcile moral rights as the principle of justice on
utilitarian grounds. 70 Professor Lyons states "the idea that people have natural
rights can be understood apart from dubious ideas about 'self-evidence.'... [A
moral right is one] that does not depend for its existence (as some legal rights
64. 130 S. C. 876, 906 (2010).
65. Id. at 901 (quoting U.S. v. Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
66. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913).
67. Fred Wilson, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, John Stuart Mill (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2009), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/.
68. See id.
69. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 260 (1978).
70. LYONS, supra note 51, at 128.
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seem to do) on some sort of social recognition or enforcement." 71 Utilitarian
ethics, according to Mill, establish principles of justice as "moral rules, which
concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of
more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life."'72
Holly Smith Goldman asserts that utilitarianism
identifies effects on human welfare as the criterion to use in assessing social
phenomena... [and] presents us with a single rule which covers all decision-
making... [and] promises to provide us with a precise formula for making
decisions... by a process of calculating the effect on human welfare which is
relatively invulnerable to the whims and biases of all-too-human decision
makers.
7 3
This "single rule" is the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the
greatest number, which contemplates a grand scheme of benevolence and
seeks out the greater happiness of the stakeholders.74 Utilitarianism may be
analyzed by dividing its theory into two principles: act-utilitarianism and rule-
utilitarianism.
Act-utilitarianism considers the net happiness for all the stakeholders. 71 It
has been criticized as an ethical theory that may justify violating a person's
rights for the long-range benefit and happiness of society. 76 Act-utilitarianism
is a teleological ethical theory that is more concerned with the consequences
of the act on society, than with the morality of the act itself.77 An example of
this is section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which grants federal
immunity from liability to a provider of an interactive web site for content
posted by an outsider.78 The Supreme Court took a utilitarian approach in
United States v. American Library Ass'n, holding that federal legislation
requiring libraries to utilize Internet filtering software as a prerequisite to
receiving federal funding did not violate patrons' First Amendment rights.79
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the government has
broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding what private
71. See id; see also Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Laiw
Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REV. 59, 126 (2008) ("[T]he utilitarian approach helps reconcile consequentialism
and nonconsequentialism within contract law by maximizing efficiency through the mechanism of promise
keeping.").
72. JOHN STUART MELL, UTILITARIANISM 75 (Forgotten Books 2008).
73. Holly Smith Goldman, Raivls and Utilitarianism, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION 346-47 (Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith eds., 1980).
74. See id. at 346.
75. See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ethics, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/ (last visited Mar.
232011).
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2011).
79. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2002) (plurality opinion).
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speech to make available to the public." 80 In a decision some say "undermines
the court's landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, which has helped preserve
the constitutional right to remain silent for more than four decades," 81 the
Supreme Court held in Berghuis v. Thompkins "an accused who wants to
invoke his or her right to remain silent [must] do so unambiguously. ' 82 The
Court found that when the defendant responded to a detective's question after
a three hour interrogation during which he primarily remained silent, that
response was a sufficient waiver of his right to remain silent.8 3 Seemingly
adopting a utilitarian approach that focuses on the benefit to society, Justice
Kennedy writing for the majority stated: "A requirement of an unambiguous
invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that 'avoid[s]
difficulties of proof and... provide[s] guidance to officers' on how to proceed
in the face of ambiguity."8 4
Rule-utilitarianism relies on case precedent but allows for judicial review
authorizing the overruling of a law that is no longer effective. It is yoked to
tradition and less concerned with subjective personal judgments. 5 Although
not based on the formal principles of Kant's "categorical imperatives," it does
rely on empirical consequences that are often aimed at the long-range benefit
to society.86  According to both act and rule utilitarianism the good
consequences of the act must be the happiness of society for it to be ethical.8 7
D. LEGAL REALISM - Justice 0. W. Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935)
"The real justification of a rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to
bring about a social end which we desire. "88
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law
80. Id. at 204.
81. Steven Shapiro, The Thompkins Decision: A Threat to Civil Liberties, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2010, at
A19.
82. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994)).
85. See Andrew R. Strauss, Note, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forestfor the Retributivist Trees: An
Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOzO L. REV.
1549, 1563-64 (2002).
86. Id. at 1563 (citing Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics, in THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE 3
(1997)); see also infra Part II.E.
87. M. Francis Reeves, Ethical Theories: Tools for Decision Making3l, 38, 40, app. 22 (unpublished notes).
88. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
210, 238 (1920).
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Justice Holmes is considered to be the founder of legal realism. 89 Holmes
rejected legal fundamentalism that used the rule of law as an objective
standard of jurisprudence. Legal realism is a method of analyzing a
transaction and allowing the facts to dictate their own rules rather than
imposing external regulations. 90 William L. Twining of the University argues
that legal realism affected social change and legal reform by appealing to
values that are not found in appellate court decisions or other material
traditionally used in law school education. 91 Karl N. Llewellyn believes that
legal realism was not an ideology or coherent legal philosophy but rather a
method or technique, which could be used by legal scholars regardless of their
philosophy.92 This notion of legal realism as a method or technique to assist
one in understanding the value orientation of a legal decision is a viable option
to scholars who are concerned with the philosophical implications of
decisional law.93 Roscoe Pound, a legal realist and the founder of sociological
jurisprudence, suggested as early as 1910 that law professors should be
students of sociology, economics and politics to remedy the backwardness of
law in meeting social problems.94 Current law school curricula follow that
counsel with their many diverse elective courses and legal movements in such
areas as Law & Society, Technology & Law, Law & Economics, Protecting
the Environment, and Feminist Studies.
What eventually emerged from the legal realism movement was a belief
that law is political and involved with social phenomena.95 One can look to
the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA to find evidence of
89. See Thomas A. Reed, Holmes and the Paths of the Laii', 37 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 273, 301 (1993) ("To
talk of reasoning from behind 'the veil of ignorance' would have been for Holmes to talk nonsense. People
are social creatures, marked by sex, race, intellectual capacity. To decide without reference to oneself, or to
our culture's place in history, was to Holmes absurd, misguided and arrogant ... ").
90. N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Realism: The Newly Uncovered
Private Correspondence, 1927 1931, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 921, 966 (1987).
91. See WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 5 7 (1973).
92. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, TiE COMMON LAW TRADITION DECIDING APPEALS 510 app. B (1960).
93. Bruce W. Brower, Dispositional Ethical Realism, 103 ETTCS 221, 222 (1993) ("Dispositional ethical
realism is the view that ethical properties are specified by empirically discoverable, reductive accounts that
treat moral properties as... dependent on evaluators' responses or dispositions to respond.").
94. See Roscoe Pound, Lu, in Books and Lo, in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12,35 36(1910).
95. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lacyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 524 (1990) ("The truth about
legal realism for lawyers mandates that legal ethics acknowledge the distinction that lawyers have to shape
the.., legal rules .... Legal ethics owes the profession and society a credible account of how that distinction
should be exercised."); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Realism About the High Court, 18 FED. L. REV. 27, 39
(1988) ("[I]f people are told that the Court has never been, and cannot be, apolitical ... then many will
conclude that 'anything goes' the only question being whether the judges' politics are to be 'conservative'
or 'progressive', a question to be settled (as it is now in the United States) at the time of their appointment.");
Allan Ides, Realism, Rationality and Justice Byron White: Three Easy Cases, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 283, 283
86; John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, David Souter's Bad Constitutional History, WALL ST. J., June
14, 2010, at A15 ("A judge, [Souter] said, must determine which of the conflicting constitutional values
should become our fundamental law by taking account of new social realities.").
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legal realism. 96 In that case the Court recognized Massachusetts' right to sue
the EPA over the negative impact of global warming on the state. 97 The
Supreme Court determined that The Clean Air Act "authorizes EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event
that it forms a 'judgment' that such emissions contribute to climate
change." 98  Recognizing that "[a] well-documented rise in global
temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere," 99 Justice Stevens concluded that
"[the] EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide
whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action
was therefore 'arbitrary, capricious.., or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 100 The Court's reliance on other disciplines, in this case evidence from
the scientific community, as a means to resolve a legal dispute is a hallmark of
legal realism.
The Court also adopted a legal realist approach in Bilski v. Kappos.'0' In
affirming the patentability of business methods, the Court recognized that
"times change [and] [tiechnology and other innovations progress in
unexpected ways." 10 2  Quoting the Court's decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Court went on to state that "[a] categorical rule denying
patent protection for 'inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress...
would frustrate the purposes of patent law.""' 10 3 The legal realists were
interdisciplinary and their legal casebooks acknowledged the reliance on
history, economics, sociology and psychiatry as relevant to legal education. 104
As technology and business methods continue to co-evolve, courts can be
expected to modify rules of law based on the theory of legal realism, such as
by integrating science with traditional legal syllogism when resolving
disputes.
96. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
97. Id. at 505.
98. Id. at 528.
99. Id. at 504 05 (2007).
100. Id. at 534.
101. See 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
102. Id. at 3227.
103. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)).
104. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 4 (1986). The guidelines established
for business schools by the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business have adopted a similar
interdisciplinary attitude toward business education.
2011]
576 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:4
E. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES - Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity....
For enlightenment of this kind; all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom
in question is the most innocuous form of all: freedom to make public use of
one's reason in all matters. "105
- Immanuel Kant, Was istAuJklarung [What is Enlightenment?]
Kant is considered by many authorities as the most prominent philosopher
of his generation, and he wrote extensively about morals and ethics. With
respect to ethics he is best known for his "categorical imperatives."10 6 For
example: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my
maxim should become a universal law."' 17  One could paraphrase that to
mean: What if everyone did what I am about to do? What would be the result
of my conduct on society?
Another of his famous categorical imperatives is: "Act in such a way that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another,
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means."108 This
means that an act should be moral or ethical as an end in itself and not merely
as a means to accomplish an ulterior motive. Kant's moral philosophy is a
deontological theory. 1° 9 One could say that deontology demands that we
follow a duty arising from a contract or a relationship that obligates a certain
course of action. Kant's categorical imperatives are useful in case analyses
based on violated contract or fiduciary relationships. The law of contracts and
torts relies on duties imposed by law, with a Kantian obligation to obey their
dictates. In United States v. Philip Morris USA the DC Circuit affirmed a
district court ruling that leading tobacco companies had committed fraud
105. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?" in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 54 55 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970).
106. See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Kant, http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta (last visited Mar.
23,2011).
107. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James W. Ellington trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993).
108. Id. at 36.
109. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Deontological
Ethics (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.s nford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/
(noting that:
The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (deon) and science (or study) of (logos). In
contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which
choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of
moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories)).
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against the general public for several decades.110 In reaching his conclusion,
District Court Judge Kessler held, in part:
[I]t is absurd to believe that the highly-ranked representatives and agents of
these corporations and entities had no knowledge that their public statements
were false and fraudulent. The Findings of Fact are replete with examples of
C.E.O.s, Vice-Presidents, and Directors of Research and Development, as well
as the Defendants' lawyers, making statements which were inconsistent with
the internal knowledge and practice of the corporation itself.' 11
Judge Kessler's holding adopts Kant's categorical imperative of "truth telling"
expressed as: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will
that my maxim should become a universal law." 112  The record clearly
indicates that the Philip Morris executives violated that imperative.
F. THE ORIGINAL POSITION - John Rawls (1921 - 2002)
"A legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational
persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the
framework for social cooperation. When these rules are just they establish
a basis for legitimate expectations. They constitute grounds upon which
persons can rely on one another and rightly object when their expectations
are not fulfilled. "I I 3
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice established a renaissance in political
theory.1 4 His analysis of justice is useful to a discussion of ethics and how it
applies to contemporary decisional law, and his criticism of our notions of
liberty and equality has been widely discussed in law review literature." 5
110. 566 F.3d 1095, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
111. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,853 (D.D.C. 2006).
112. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 70 (H.J. Paton ed., HarperCollins 2009)
(1785).
113. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971).
114. See Victoria Meikle, Book Review, 36 MCGILL L. J. 692 (1991) (reviewing C-ANDRAN KUKATHAS &
PI-TILP PETTIT, RAWLS "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" AND ITS CRITICS (1990)) (providing a critique of Rawls'
contractarian argument).
115. See, e.g, Michael P. Zuckert, The New Rav/s and Constitutional Theory: Does It Really Taste That
Much Better?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227-28 (1994); Rex Martin, Raivls"s New Theory of Justice, 69
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 737 (1994); S. A. Lloyd, Relativizing Rawils, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 709 (1994); Stephen
M. Griffin, Political Philosophy 17ersus Political Theory: The Case of Rais, 69 CH.-KENT L. REV. 691
(1994); Joan A. Pisarchik, A Raivisian Analysis of the Immigration Act of 1990, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 721,
731 (1992) ("[I]mmigrants are generally those who are worst off because they have the fewest social and
economic rights. They are the recipients of unequal treatment and such unequal treatment is allowable in a
Rawlsian framework only if... the least advantaged members of society benefit.").
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Legal scholars would do well to expose themselves to his ideas as an approach
to understanding our legal system in a new light, one that is especially
sensitive to minority interests.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes:
During much of modem moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory
has been some form of utilitarianism. One reason for this is that it has been
espoused by a long line of brilliant writers who have built up a body of thought
truly impressive in its scope and refinement.... Those who criticized them...
failed.., to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it ....
What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of
abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract.... The theory that results
is highly Kantian in nature.] 16
Rawls posits relationships between individuals and the community and
develops two principles of justice that he believes would be applied by people
in "the original position" (i.e., a group of people who are unaware of their
social status in society and come together to form a social contract).' 1 7
He defines the "original position" as a community that would apply
"principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the
fundamental terms of their association."' 18 Rawls uses the original position as
a hypothetical situation where
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength and the like. The principles of justice are chosen behind a
veil of ignorance.... Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the
result of a fair agreement or bargain. 119
Rawls argues that two principles of justice would be chosen by those in the
original position. 20 First, the Equal Liberty Principle: "[Ejach person is to
have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others." 12 1 Notice how this differs from a utilitarian position
of "the greater good for the greater number" that necessitates the "lesser
number" will not be granted "equal rights." Many case decisions and
legislative laws adopt the utilitarian theory and sacrifice minority interests. 122
116. RAWLS, supra note 113, at vii-viii.
117. Leif Wenar, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, John Rawls (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 12.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 102 122 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Democratic Equality Principle: "[S]ocial and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected
to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all."'12
3
Rawls would insist that equality and freedom are the two basic political
principles that must be applied by those who deliberate in the original position
behind a veil of ignorance and establish contractual rules for their public
institutions and individual welfare. Members of his hypothetical group would
not need to reject their personal beliefs and values providing their credence to
a personal philosophy; moral standards or religious beliefs are not imposed on
others. 124 Judicial philosophy that argues for affirmative action would support
a Rawlsian theory. Cases such as Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke125 and Grutter v. Bollinger,1 26 which uphold affirmative action policies
in institutes of higher education, illustrate judicial adoption of Rawls'
philosophical principles of equal liberty and democratic equality.
G. PRiMA FACIE DUTIES -W.D. Ross (1877-1971)
"Our duty, then, is not to do certain things which will produce certain
results. Our acts, at any rate our acts of special obligation, are not right
because they will produce certain results - which is the view common to
all forms of utilitarianism. 1,27
- William David Ross, The Right and the Good
W.D. Ross was a "moral intuitionist" who established prima facie duties
that are generally binding, irrespective of their results, based on a moral
obligation to perform. 128 For instance he stated, "[u]nless stronger moral
obligations override, one ought to keep a promise."1 29 He argues, however,
that it is more important that our duties fit the facts than Kant's absolute
obligation to always tell the truth regardless of the consequences.1 30 Ross
states that in exceptional cases "the consequences of fulfilling a promise...
123. Id.
124. See LYONS, supra note 51, at 190.
125. 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (holding that the use of race as a criterion for admission at higher
education institutions is permissible).
126. 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) ("[J]n the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity
contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly
harm nonminority applicants.").
127. WILLIAM DAVID Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 46 (1930).
128. Jan Garrett, A Simple and Usable (Although Incomplete) Ethical Theory Based on the Ethics of
W.D. Ross, W. KY. UNIV. (Aug. 10, 2004), http://www.wku.edu/-jan.garrett/ethics/rossethc.htm.
129. Id.
130. Ross, supranote 127, at 18 19.
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would be so disastrous to others that we judge it right not to do so." '131
From a legal perspective his "promise keeping" duty is useful in developing
legal arguments based on contractual obligations or implied tortious duties.
Of special interest is his insistence that "[t]he moral order... is just as much
part of the fundamental nature of the universe.., as is the spatial or
numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic." 132
This proposal compels Ross to develop his ethical theory on the basis of
conflicting duties that often create ethical dilemmas that can always be
resolved because one of his prima facie duties has preference over another.
Selecting the most important duty is his way of resolving an ethical
dilemma.
Since our judiciary is often called upon to resolve cases where the facts
create conflicting duties, for instance in employment disparate-treatment
(the employer's implied duty not to engage in intentional discrimination)
and disparate-impact (the employer's implied duty prohibiting unintentional
discrimination), 3 3 it is useful to review Ross's prima facie duties as
obligations implied as promises and observe how our jurisprudence often
reflects a Rossian ethical theory.1 34
Ross argues that an actual duty is accompanied by a moral duty to
perform and he provides a list of prima facie duties to be used as guidelines
in resolving ethical dilemmas. 135 Courts often apply these duties when
confronted with a dispute, thereby adopting moral obligations into our
jurisprudence.
The first duty, of fidelity, relates to promise keeping that may be
contractual, express or implied, under the circumstances. 36 From a legal
perspective one can trace contractual duties from the contract terms and
conditions and implied duties from a fiduciary relationship 37 or from duties
implied under tort law. Court decisions that discuss duties expressed or
implied in law are following Ross's notion of prima facie duties of fidelity
as obligations to keep and perform promises. Next, the duty of reparation is
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 29-30.
133. See infra Part 111.
134. Ross, supra note 127, at 46-47.
135. Id.
136. Id. at21.
137. In 1939 the Supreme Court of Delaware in Guth v. Loft ruled that corporate directors owe the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
These fiduciary duties continue to be recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Brewer, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60863, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) ("[A]II directors and officers of a corporation owe
their shareholders fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.").
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a duty to compensate for injuries done to others.138 Contract and tort
damages are based on the defendant's duty to compensate the aggrieved
plaintiff for loss resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant.'39 When a court awards punitive damages, it is engaging in
providing compensation to the plaintiff based on the prima facie duty of
reparation for the defendant's egregious harmful conduct. 140 The duty of
gratitude is founded on an obligation when granted a benefit, individual or
social, without cost, and has relevance to a philanthropic undertaking,
including the tax advantages attributable to non-profit corporations. 141 The
non-profit entity, in return for the tax advantage provided by the state, has a
duty to perform a social service to the public. Our common law of
negligence is based on the duty of non-malfeasance-not to harm others. 142
This obligation is resolved by the courts1 43 where a duty to perform carefully
has been unintentionally violated resulting in injury to the defendant.
Duty to prevent harm. One could argue that statutes such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act 144 that prohibit employment discrimination utilize this duty to
prevent harm to the employee. With the duty of beneficence, 145  Ross is
concerned with a duty to enhance the well-being of others. Statutory laws
often follow that precept in an attempt to remedy a social malady.146 The duty
of self-improvement 147 relates to laws that obligate individuals to help
themselves, such as probation and compulsory driver's education in driving
under the influence cases. Ross's duty of justice 48 makes for an interesting
comparison with Rawls's Equal Liberty Principle. Ross, along with Rawls,
finds a social duty to distribute societal benefits fairly. The federal tax code
138. WILLIAM DAVID Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 289 (Clarendon Press 1949).
139. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-702 (sellers' remedies for breach), 2-711 (buyers' remedies for breach)
(2004).
140. See Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc, 176 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Or. 2008). The Oregon Supreme Court
upheld a $79.5 million award against the cigarette manufacturer.
141. Ross, supra note 127, at 21 27; see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
142. Ross, supra note 127, at 21, 26.
143. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (upholding a decision of the Vermont
Supreme Court that allowed a plaintiff to recover from a drug manufacturer for an inadequate warning
label).
144. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
145. Ross, supra note 127, at 21.
146. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2006) (authorizing a tax deduction for medical and dental expenses).
147. Ross, supra note 127, at 21.
148. Id. at 23.
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contains provisions that follow this duty. 149  The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act1 50 is based on a duty to distribute health care to all as a
precept of social justice.
A judge's application of Ross's prima facie duties to a case relates to his or
her subsequent characterization as being liberal or conservative, a judicial
activist or a strict constructionist. Ross provides useful guidelines in analyzing
a case from a philosophical and ethical perspective.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND Ricci V. DESTEFAATO
"Learned Hand, who was one ofAmerica's best and most famous judges,
said he feared a lawsuit more than death or taxes.... People often stand to
gain or lose more by one judge's nod than they could by any general act of
Congress or Parliament. "15 I
- Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
In Law ' Empire, Ronald Dworkin sets the stage for the development of
judicial philosophy by indicating the power of the judiciary over the average
person's life. How judges decide cases and use this power involves their
background, personal experience and philosophy. Supreme Court decisions
reflect not only how the institution has functioned throughout American
history but also how jurists think. 52
A. Philosophical Analysis of Ricci v. DeStefano
The facts of the case disclose a New Haven, Connecticut, firefighter exam
used to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions. 153 The results of the exam
indicated that white candidates scored higher than minority candidates, and the
City decided to disregard the results based on statistical racial disparity. 154
White and Hispanic firefighters who passed the exam sued the City when it
refused to certify the test results, alleging that such actions discriminated
against them based on their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.155
149. One such provision is the Earned Income Tax Credit offered to low to moderate income families to
either offset a tax liability or generate a refund. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2006).
150. Pub. L. No. 111-148,124 Stat. 119 (2010).
151. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 1.
152. Justice Holmes' essay The Path of the Lair, written while he was a member of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, emphasized legal study as the prediction of ajudge's decision. Id. at 461.
153. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Star. 241 (codified
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The City responded that had it certified the test results it could be accused
of adopting a practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters. 156
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
Second Circuit affirmed.' 5 The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
courts and held that in disregarding the tests results the City intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiffs in violation of Title VII. 158
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito.1 59 Justice Ginsberg filed a
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer. 160 Of
interest is that the so-called conservative block joined Justice Kennedy, and
the liberal block joined Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.
The theories presented above provide insight into the judicial reasoning
employed by the opinion writers in this case. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy expresses the following view of Title VII:
As enacted in 1964, Title Vi's principal nondiscrimination provision held
employers liable only for disparate treatment. That section retains its original
wording today. It makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation. terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 161
The opinion goes on to explain the nature of disparate impact
discrimination. "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include an express
prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact."162 The
Court recognized this prohibition in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.1 63 and
Congress later codified it in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.164 "Under the
disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by
showing that an employer uses 'a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.' '1 65
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
156. 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2663.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2672.
162. Id.
163. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
164. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(2011)).
165. 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006)).
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Natural law. Recognizing that the Court should interpret statutory law to
give effect to both disparate treatment and disparate impact concerns,
Justice Kennedy stated:
The purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications.
rather than on the basis of race or color. In searching for a standard that strikes
a more appropriate balance, we note that this Court has considered cases
similar to this one, albeit in the context of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has held that certain government actions to
remedy past racial discrimination actions that are themselves based on race
are constitutional only where there is a strong basis in evidence that the
remedial actions were necessary. 1
66
This reference to the Equal Protection Clause in establishing a standard
when disparate-impact and disparate-treatment are in conflict is of interest
when searching for a judicial philosophy supporting the Court's position.
The Bill of Rights is the foundation for developing government equality and
freedoms based on a natural law theory of objective fundamental rights. The
notion of applying the Equal Protection Clause as a remedy for past racial
discrimination as the Court did in Ricci also appeals to a sense of fairness
when there is empirical evidence to support the injustice of race
discrimination. Natural law principles found in the Bill of Rights protect
individuals from injustices including racial discrimination that violate
human dignity and the common good. 167 Justice Scalia, concurring in Ricci,
states: "Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection? The question is not an easy one."' 168 The
Court continues to be conscious of a potential conflict between Title VII
and its implementation by an employer that could violate the Equal
Protection Clause. This constitutional guarantee has its roots in the natural
law principal of fairness as part of our social contract and a conservative
justice would be reluctant to read into that clause a guarantee of equal
protection.
In Roscoe Pound's Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, he states that
"natural law [should] [express] the nature of government."' 169 One could
argue the nature of government is to provide equal protection of the law
including preventing employment discrimination on the basis of race and
color. Professor Pound further states that natural law principles are
166. Id. at 2675 (internal quotations omitted).
167. See AQUINAS, supra note 14, at 995 ("A law.., regards ... the order to the common good.").
168. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. POUND, supra note 32, at 50.
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"protected by the Bill of Rights."170 The philosophical theory underlying
the Equal Protection clause is a natural law principle obligating an
employer to equally treat employees in a fair and equitable manner. Justice
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion stated in part:
In construing Title VII.... equal protection doctrine is of limited utility. The
Equal Protection Clause, this Court has held, prohibits only intentional
discrimination: it does not have a disparate-impact component.... Title VII, in
contrast, aims to eliminate all forms of employment discrimination,
unintentional as well as deliberate. Until today... this Court has never
questioned the constitutionality of the disparate-impact component of Title VII,
and for good reason. By instructing employers to avoid needlessly exclusionary
selection processes, Title Vii's disparate-impact provision calls for a "race-
neutral means to increase minority.., participation" something this Court's
equal protection precedents also encourage.... Observance of Title VIi's
disparate-impact provision... calls for no racial preference, absolute or
otherwise. The very purpose of the provision is to ensure that individuals are
hired and promoted based on qualifications manifestly necessary to successful
performance of the job in question. qualifications that do not screen out
members of any race. 171
Justice Ginsburg builds her argument on the legal theory that disparate-
impact (unintentional discrimination) is not inconsistent with the
constitutionality of Title VII and its very purpose calls for no racial
preference. Its purpose is to assure that "individuals are hired and promoted
based on qualifications.., necessary to successful performance of the job in
question. ' 172 The very essence of natural law would support the "no racial
preference, absolute or otherwise" holding of Justice Ginsburg's
argument.1 73 Lon Fuller would agree with Justice Ginsburg's dissent as
consistent with his position that the natural law's essential function is to
"achiev[e] a certain kind of order... through subjecting people's conduct to
the guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their
behavior.... 174 The dissent relies on natural law insofar as it provides rules
(i.e. Title VII) that require employers to behave in a manner that will
achieve social justice.1 75
Legal Positivism. Contemporary scholars continue to explore legal
positivism. Professor Brian Bix of the University of Minnesota School of
Law summarizes this theory as follows: "[in simple terms, legal positivism
is built around the belief, the assumption or the dogma that the question of
170. RoscoE POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 13 (Univ. Neb. Press 1950).
171. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 2701.
173. Id.
174. Lon L. Fuller, A Reply to Professors Cohen and Diworkin, 10 VILL. L. REv. 655, 657 (1965).
175. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2689 2710 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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what is the law is separate from (and must be kept separate from) the
question of what the law should be." 176  Bix quotes Austin for further
support:
The existence of law is one thing its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be
or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though
we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate
our approbation and disapprobation.
177
When Congress enacted Title VII it recognized the social problem of
discrimination and stated the prohibition creating a legal and moral duty
based on the social phenomenon of race discrimination in the workplace. 178
Professor H.L.A. Hart in his text, The Concept of Law, argues that facts
may internalize a standard and thereby create a rule. 1 9 In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg maintains that the plaintiffs have a right to sympathy, but
not to relief under the law. 180 Justice Alito responds, seemingly adopting
the notion of legal positivism in his concurrence:
The dissent grants that petitioners' situation is "unfortunate" and that they
"understandably attract this Court's sympathy." But "sympathy" is not what
petitioners have a right to demand. What they have a right to demand is
evenhanded enforcement of the law of Title Vii's prohibition against
discrimination based on race. And that is what, until today's decision, has been
denied them.1 8
1
Justice Alito's conclusion illustrates that the legal positivist notion of
unbiased enforcement of the law prohibits reverse discrimination and those
scoring highest on the test should not be discriminated against simply
because they are not in the minority.
Utilitarianism. In John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, he argues that moral
rules are "essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of
more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life...."'18 2
Title VII is an example of "act-utilitarianism" that concerns itself with the
net happiness for all the stakeholders for the long-term benefit and
happiness of society. It recognizes, as a teleological theory, that the
consequences of the act may not benefit all parties. Mill asserts:
176. BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE THEORY AND CONTEXT 35-36 (5th ed. 2009) (quoting JOHN AUSTN,
THE PROVTNCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMTNED 157 (1832)).
177. Id.
178. See generally S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2355.
179. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
180. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring).
182. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 87 (Forgotten Books 1925) (1863).
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Act utilitarianism is contextual in nature. It is sometimes called "situational
ethics." On an act by act basis consider all the alternatives and choose the
action that will produce the most happiness for all the stakeholders in the
future. You count as one equally with others. Everyone impartially has equal
weight. It does not mean everyone will be happy with your decision. 183
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that allowing the City to
disregard the test results would negatively impact some of the parties. 8 4
She states: "The white firefighters who scored high on New Haven's
promotional exam understandably attract this Court's sympathy. But they
had no vested right to promotion."18 5  Adopting a utilitarian approach,
Justice Ginsburg seemingly concludes the greatest good to be that which
results from disregarding the promotional exams despite the detriment to
those who scored the highest on the exam.
In adopting a utilitarian approach, Justice Ginsburg reminds us that
"[e]thics is not a matter of rigid rule keeping. It is rather a matter of being
flexible in real situations and using your reason to maximize net long-range
happiness for everyone." 18 6 In this case, to ignore the existence of disparate
impact concerns would adversely affect minority candidates in a field where
there has been a long history of discrimination in the workplace.
Legal Realism. Justice Holmes once stated that "[t]he real justification of
a rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to bring about a social end
which we desire," a classic expression of legal realism relevant to the
philosophy supporting Title VII.187 The civil rights movement identified
employment discrimination as a social evil needing legal reform. 188 Legal
realism recognized that law is political and the social phenomenon of
employment discrimination mandated social change to enhance the
constitutional value of equal protection under law.18 9
In both Justice Alito's concurrence and Justice Ginsburg's dissent there
is mention of what role, if any, the mayor's political motivation to cater to a
segment of his constituency may have impacted the city's decision to
disregard the test results. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg observes:
As courts have recognized, 4[p]oliticians routinely respond to bad press... but it
is not a violation of Title VII to take advantage of a situation to gain political
favor.' The real issue then, is not whether the mayor and his staff were
183. Reeves, supra note 87, at 38.
184. 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Reeves, supra note 87, at 38.
187. COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 92, at 210, 238.
188. See generally 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972).
189. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2687 88 (Alito, J., concurring).
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politically motivated; it is whether their attempt to score political points was
legitimate (i.e., nondiscriminatory). Were they seeking to exclude white
firefighters from promotion... or did they realize, at least belatedly, that their
tests could be toppled in a disparate- impact suit? 1 90
Justice Ginsburg's acknowledgement of the possible role of politics in
decision making with regard to enforcement of Title VII supports the legal
realist's view of using law as a means of achieving social results.
Immanuel Kant. Kant's categorical imperatives support Title VII. He
stated to "always use humanity... never merely as a means, but at the same
time as an end." 191 Kant would not agree with a workplace practice that
discriminated on the basis of race as a means to placate other workers.
Contemporary Kantian philosophers have expressed it this way:
Man's moral title to external freedom thus carries with it a correlative duty to
respect the same right in others. And since men cannot be relied upon to
observe this duty voluntarily, it must be enforced. This is the function of the
Law and the office of the State which enforces those duties all men must
observe so that each can enjoy the greatest external liberty compatible with the
like liberty of everyone else. 192
In upholding the rights of the high scoring white and Hispanic firefighters,
Justice Kennedy adopts this theory as expressed in the majority decision in
Ricci:
[The district court] ruled that respondents' "motivation to avoid making
promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact... does not, as a
matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent" under Title VII." .... And the
Government makes a similar argument in this Court. It contends that the
"structure of Title VII belies any claim that an employer's intent to comply
with Title VIi's disparate-impact provisions constitutes prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race.".... But both of those statements turn upon
the City's objective avoiding disparate-impact liability while ignoring the
City's conduct in the name of reaching that objective. Whatever the City's
ultimate aim-however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed-
the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the
test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white. 193
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia appears to be utilizing Kant's categorical
imperative of treating individuals as ends in themselves. He states: "[T]he
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of
190. Id. at 2709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2007)).
191. JENS TIMMERMANN, KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (2007).
192. Gunnar Beck, Immanuel Kant's Theory of Rights, 19 RATIO JURIS 371, 375 (2006).
193. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671, 2673 74 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D.
Conn. 2006)).
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a racial, religious, sexual or national class." 19 4 Enforcement of the disparate
impact guidelines in this context would, in Scalia's view, amount to
unprotected reverse discrimination.
John Rawls Theory of Justice. Rawls's original position theory, in which
judgments are made behind a veil of ignorance, imagines a group of people
coming together to form a social contract unaware of their social status in
society.1 95 Rawls states: "First of all, no one knows his place in society, his
class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength and
the like."' 196 In that arrangement members in the group would not know
their race and would be in agreement with a law such as Title VII that
prohibits workplace discrimination. 197 His "equal liberty principle" that
"[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with similar liberty for others" 198 would support the value of
Title VII legislation. 99 Further, his "democratic equality principle" that
"[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are... to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged" 200 is a philosophical theory that
justifies Title VII. Justice Ginsberg states in her dissent:
The Court's recitation of the facts leaves out important parts of the story.
Firefighting is a profession in which the legacy of racial discrimination casts an
especially long shadow. In extending Title VII to state and local government
employers in 1972, Congress took note of a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(USCCR) report finding racial discrimination in municipal employment even
"more pervasive than in the private sector." According to the report, overt
racism was partly to blame, but so too was a failure on the part of municipal
employers to apply merit-based employment principles. In making hiring and
promotion decisions, public employers often "rel[ied] on criteria unrelated to
job performance," including nepotism or political patronage. Such flawed
selection methods served to entrench preexisting racial hierarchies. The
USCCR report singled out police and fire departments for having "[b]arriers to
equal employment... greater... than in any other area of State or local
government." with African-Americans "hold[ing] almost no positions in the
officer ranks.' 2
0 1
194. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
195. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
196. RAWLS, supra note 116, at 137.
197. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHATS THE RIGHT THING To Do? 153 (2009) ("Underlying
the device of the veil of ignorance is a moral argument that can be presented independent of the thought
experiment. Its main idea is that... opportunity should not be based on factors that are arbitrary from a
moral point of view.").
198. RAWLS, supra note 113, at 60.
199. Id. at61.
200. Id. at 83.
201. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690-91 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep.
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The "important parts of the story" that Justice Ginsburg recites in her
dissenting opinion are supportive of the Rawlsian Equal Liberty
Principal. 20 2 Of interest is that the development of her argument is based on
a historical and contemporary racial segregation in the public employment
sector. Her jurisprudence reflects the philosophical theory of Rawls's
Theory of Justice that "[elach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others." 20 3
W.D. Ross's Prima Facie Duties. Ross's duty to society would include a
duty of justice to distribute the benefits of society in a fair manner. 20 4 The
strategy behind a standardized test for firefighters seeking the positions of
lieutenants and captains is based on a fair distribution of these positions
according to competency levels rather than race preference. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, did not find in the record evidence of
the questions being unrelated to the job and held, under the "strong basis in
evidence rule" that the City did not offer sufficient evidence to rescind the
test results. 205 One could argue that the examination constituted an implied
promise to award the jobs to those who passed the exam and this created a
prima facie "duty of fidelity" because the candidates relied upon the City's
offer. Justice Ginsburg's dissent stated: "In making hiring and promotion
decisions, public employers often 'rel[Ied] on criteria unrelated to job
performance,' including nepotism or political patronage.... Such flawed
selection methods served to entrench preexisting racial hierarchies. '20 6
Ross's position that in exceptional cases "the consequences of fulfilling a
promise... would be so disastrous to others that we judge it right not to do
so''207 would support Justice Ginsburg's dissent assuming this is an
exceptional case based on historical evidence of race discrimination. The
manner in which a judge interprets the evidence of a case will indicate a
philosophical orientation that is always fact sensitive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Jurisprudence, as the philosophy of the law, plays an important role in
understanding how a court resolves a dispute. A court's decision often reflects
a legal philosophy that is useful in understanding and contextualizing a judge's
No. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2152, and in 118 CoNG. REC. 1817).
202. Id.
203. RAWLS, supra note 113, at 60.
204. Ross, supra note 127, at 26-27.
205. 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
206. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
207. Ross, supra note 127, at 18.
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decision-making methods. By analyzing a decision from a legal philosophical
perspective, one better understands the judge's judicial philosophy, which is
more useful than a superficial classification of "liberal" or "conservative"
orientation. Constitutional values can be defended from the perspective of
many legal philosophical theories, and judges and legislatures often utilize
different philosophies for different purposes. It is important to recognize that a
judge's decision will often adopt various legal philosophical theories, and
conservative and liberal judges may follow principles established by different
philosophers and judicial theorists. Recognizing a legal philosophical theory
reflected in a judicial opinion provides an insightful perspective that exceeds
the bare judicial argument stated in the decision. Comprehending the legal
philosophy in a judge's decision provides a clearer understanding of the
opinion and renders a more meaningful debate of the issues.

